Tag Archives: housing

10 things we know more about than the level of serviced land

We don’t know how much serviced land, land ready for housing, there is. The last annual data series end in 2012, with a survey (in a different format) from 2014.. But we do know more recent data on the following 10 things, none of which , I would argue, are more important than solving the housing crisis.

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Ireland- subsiding housing market failure

Economics has a lot to say about market failure, its causes consequences and resolution.  The government know these. Indeed, at the cabinet table sits a man with formal economic training, in Richard Bruton, who knows these things. If they don’t, or have forgotten, then a phone call to the Government Economic Service will refresh or remind. Yet, despite this they have determined to reinforce the failure in the housing market with more failure. What fresh hell is this? In an environment where we have record homelessness the government adamantly sets its face against the acceptance that the market alone cannot, will not, is not able to even if it wished, provide sufficient homes for people, whether rented or purchased.

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Would maximum Loan to Value Ratios have much effect on Dublin House Prices?

The central bank of Ireland is rumoured to be interested in imposing loan to value limits, as well as loan to income limits, on mortgages. The objective here, it appears, is to try and cool down the housing market in Dublin.

A big part of the problem in the Dublin market, which is going gangbusters, is a shortage of supply. Lots of reasons given for this shortage of supply, such as the cost of house building is still too high relative to what can be achieved, the lack of serviced land, the willingness of banks to lend working capital for property development etc. Be that as it may, the supply-side issues will take time to work through. Will loan to value limits work? Continue reading

How does negative housing equity interact with the decision to default?

Screenshot 2014-07-18 11.25.06


Michael Seiler thinks it might be this way… see his paper below for more details.


Seiler, Michael Joseph, Determinants of the Strategic Mortgage Default Cumulative Distribution Function (June 20, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2465059 orhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2465059




Bubbles in the Dublin Housing Market?

Is there a bubble in the Dublin house market? The latest figures might well give one pause for thought, with a 22% year on year increase, clearly unsustainable.


However, this may not be the entire story.
A newly developed statistical technique (see here and here for previous posts using it to talk about bubbles in London and Bitcoin) has, it is claimed, good power to detect bubbles. Below see the results for real dublin house prices, 1996 prices, for new and second hand homes.
dublin new
dublin second
We can interpret these as a bubble being present in the series when the blue line exceeds the red line. It clearly picks up the last bubble period, and interestingly dates its beginning to the 1997-1998 period. What it also shows is that there seems to be no such bubble at present.
This is only a statistical test – it is by no means definitive. What is clear is that bubble or no, Dublin prices in nominal terms are rising unsustainably fast.

What is your thought reader?

Someone needs to define affordability in mortgages

This is a version of a column which appeared in the Irish Examiner 14 September 2013

Since the appearance of the banks before the oireachtas committees last week we have seen a lot of discussion on the mortgage issue. Like the poor, speculation about mortgages will always be with us it seems.

A vexed element of the mortgage story is that we still know little about what the extent is of “wont pay” versus “cant pay”. This debate has been raging now for months and we still are no further along than we were at the start. The very term “strategic default” itself is fuzzy and incoherent. It implies a degree of deliberate decision making that is absent from all studies (outside Ireland) where the evidence is that the overwhelming determination of default is an emotional not a rational decision.


Underlying this and running through other issues related to debt is one common denominator- we have no definition of what is and what is not affordable. Take the discussions on the insolvency regimes. Anyone who has read the guidelines for what is and what is not acceptable expenditure will note a massively intrusive approach into peoples spending. While people who are in mortgage default or those who worse end up in insolvency clearly need some assistance with their spending habits, the bottom up approach imposes significant compliance costs and significant monitoring costs. Whose business it is , apart from those spending it, what money is spent on sticking plasters?


A much simpler approach could, if there was regulatory will, be imposed which harks back to the past. This is to determine what is an acceptable percentage of after tax salary to spend on the servicing of debt. Typically this was seen as being in the region of 35%. What is interesting is that in the United States the percentage of household income devoted to debt service has hovered around the 10-15% for decades. The closest we can get in this country from the quarterly financial accounts suggests that as an economy as a whole we are around the same rate. But in Ireland we have a situation where the household sector is, financially, fractured. First we have more households without than with a mortgage. While non mortgage households will have other debts they will of necessity have much lower percentages of disposable income taken by debt service than those that have mortgages. Second, within the mortgaged households we have those in arrears (some 18%) and those without. Again, we do not have up to date information on how financially stressed these two elements are. The proponents of massive strategic default (or fraud as they are seemingly reluctant to call it) would have one believe that there is little, and that the 18% are for a large part simply keeping up a (non housing related) lifestyle that they cannot afford. It is perhaps more likely that these are more financially stressed and that they devote a larger part of after tax income to debt repayment than those who are not in default.


So what about mortgage debt? It might be simpler for the incoming regulator to state that 35%, with wiggle room of 5% either way, would represent an acceptable level of repayment for a principal private residence . The difficulty is that in doing so we would probably cause a significant hole to appear in the banks balance sheets. A very large number of mortgages would be reclassified as non-repayable were we to do this. This would cause the banks to have to engage in real terms with the mortgage holders. And that would result in write-offs which would erode the capital of the banks. But they have already been granted capital to do this. In the last round of bank capitalization they were required to put aside nearly 10b for losses on mortgages alone. They have not written off this amount, and will not. The taxpayer however has a right to expect the funds injected to be used for the purposes stated and thus significant write-offs of debts as irrecoverable is inevitable.

Setting a public level of affordability would also allow us to get clarity on the extent of strategic default. If someone is paying 50% of aftertax income on a mortgage and still falling into default, it is doubtful if anyone would call that a strategic default. Unaffordable yes, strategic no. On the other hand, someone paying 20% who is in default might well be required to get engaged with the realities of life.

There are good economic reasons why we might want to keep opaque the details of settlements between banks and defaulters. Banks like all lenders need to be able to get as much as possible from loans and thus, unpalatable as it may be to some, they need to hold the upper hand in negotiations. But there is no reason why we should keep opaque the level of any non commercially sensitive data. In this context we could reasonably ask that the banks be required to return to the central bank and that they publish on a monthly basis the amount of repayments made on mortgages, broken as between interest and capital. Indeed this could usefully be further broken down by those in and those not in arrears.



Danish Mortgages in Ireland? No thanks

Senator Sean Barrett introduced a bill into the Senate this week to in effect restructure the Irish mortgage market along Danish (aka rational) lines. Stephen Kinsella on IrishEconomy has a post on it where he notes that the Minister nixd the bill on essentially four grounds

1. We are not, nor were we ever, Denmark.

2. Changing wholesale to this system has risks, most of which I won’t go into here, but the Danes give defaulting households 6 months and we’d really like that to be longer, say a year.

3. Changing to this system would imply loans at 80% LTV, most banks are at 92% LTV, this would make it more difficult for first time buyers.

4. We’re in the middle of negotiations on the various capital requirements directives, this could throw a spanner in the works with the EU.

The debate, which was quite good, is reported here. Note that Constantin G and myself in February mused at the Croke Park Conference that something along these lines was desirable. Its interesting that the system can take in good ideas but not it seems accept them.

Here is


With greater transparency in prices, where now for house prices ? Have your say!

So now that we have some more transparency in the housing price area, with the publication of the property price database, where do people see the average house price going? Will greater transparency via increased volume result in prices going up or will people decide that the market is still a buyers market and bid down? Ill leave this up for the evening… Please direct people to it.